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PROPORTIONAL RESPONSE: THE NEED FOR MORE—
AND MORE STANDARDIZED—VETERANS’ COURTS
Claudia Arno*
Over the past two decades, judges and legislators in a number of states have recog-
nized significant shortcomings in the ways traditional systems of criminal
corrections address cases involving criminal offenders who are veterans of the U.S.
armed services. This recognition has come at a time when policy-makers have simi-
larly recognized that, for certain subsets of criminal offenders, “diversionary”
programs may achieve better policy results than will traditional criminal punish-
ment. In accordance with these dual recognitions, some states have implemented
systems of veterans’ courts, in which certain offenders, who are also U.S. veterans,
are diverted into programs that provide monitoring, training, and occupational
and psychological counseling in lieu of imprisonment.  Because these veterans’
courts have been created on an ad hoc, state-by-state basis, it remains unclear ex-
actly how such courts should be implemented in order to be most effective.  This
Note argues that the evidence currently available suggests that veterans’ courts are
a good policy choice, in that they can have a positive impact on state criminal
systems by reducing recidivism among offenders and by conserving state resources.
Accordingly, this Note argues, states should pursue diversionary programs for at
least some subset of U.S. veterans because: (1) the U.S. government has already
invested significant resources in training veterans and helping them to develop
skills; (2) in many cases the behavior that leads to a veteran being incarcerated
stems at least in part from service-related trauma, suggesting that addressing the
trauma may correct the behavior; and (3) as a matter of equity, those who have
served in defense of the United States may be due special consideration in light of
their special sacrifices.  This said, given the difficulties inherent in determining
which veterans, in which cases, should be afforded the benefits of these diversionary
programs, that there is no coordinated state action in this area, and that many of
the potential benefits of veterans’ courts can best—or perhaps only—be realized
through a standardized, uniform model, the federal government should promulgate
standards for implementing such programs in state court systems.
INTRODUCTION
Observers of the United States’ criminal justice system have long
recognized the value of diversionary programs for certain types of
offenders, especially juveniles and those with substance abuse
problems.  The concept of special courts for America’s veterans,
* J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 2015; Ph.D., University of Michigan,
Interdepartmental Program in Greek and Roman History, 2012.  My thanks to Samuel
Brenner and to the editors of the Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
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however, is a relatively new one. That concept has become increas-
ingly popular in the past decade, with judges in numerous states
taking the initiative to establish programs catering to or focusing on
veterans in their districts. In general, veterans’ courts have been tai-
lored to the needs of individuals whose criminal behavior can be
linked to physical or emotional trauma experienced in the course
of military service. The goal of such courts is to help participants
avoid recidivism by addressing the root causes of their behaviors
and by reintegrating them into their communities with the support
of mentors who are veterans themselves.
The surge of interest in veterans’ courts is likely due in part to
the substantial increase in the number of veterans returning from
overseas conflicts in recent years, and in part to improved under-
standings by scientists and policy-makers of the relationship of
brain trauma and mental illness (notably including post-traumatic
stress disorder, or PTSD) to substance abuse and criminal behavior.
According to at least one estimate, about 140,000 veterans are cur-
rently incarcerated in state and federal prisons.1 The population of
incarcerated veterans differs significantly from the rest of the incar-
cerated population: in particular, incarcerated veterans are, on
average, older and better educated than incarcerated non-veterans;
incarcerated veterans also generally have shorter criminal histo-
ries.2 At a minimum, these differences suggest that, from the
perspective of criminal rehabilitation, it makes sense to treat these
populations differently.
This Note argues that, as a matter of criminal law policy, diver-
sionary programs for at least some subset of the United States’
veterans should be pursued because: (1) the United States govern-
ment has already invested significant resources in training veterans
and helping them develop skills that they can presumably use to
benefit society as a whole; and (2) in many cases the behavior that
leads to a veteran’s incarceration stems in part from trauma result-
ing from that veteran’s service to the United States.  (This is quite
apart from the point that, as a matter of equity, those who have
served in defense of the United States are due treatment by the
State that recognizes and honors that service.)  The widespread im-
plementation of veterans’ courts as a separate category of
1. Eileen C. Moore & Antoinette Balta, Penal Code Section 1170.9 Provides Crucial Options
to Veterans and Members of the Military, ORANGE CTY. LAW., Apr. 2014, at 16.
2. See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SPECIAL REPORT: VETERANS IN PRISON OR JAIL 4 (Jan. 2000), available at http://justiceforvets
.org/sites/default/files/files/Veterans%20in%20Jail%20or%20Prison_0.pdf (comparing in-
carcerated veterans and incarcerated nonveterans using a number of metrics including age
and education level).
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diversionary programs has the potential to reduce recidivism, pro-
mote the reintegration of low-level offenders into productive
society, and decrease the financial burdens of incarceration on gov-
ernment—all while respecting the sacrifices of the U.S. veterans.
That said, while it makes policy sense to pursue widespread im-
plementation of veterans’ courts, it is nevertheless very difficult to
formulate the criteria that should be applied in determining which
veterans should be eligible for such diversionary programs. Such
difficulties are not restricted to questions of application, but are
also inherent in questions of basic fairness. Indeed, critics of the
veterans’ courts movement have repeatedly raised concerns about
disparate treatment of veteran and non-veteran offenders, espe-
cially in cases involving violent offenses and, specifically, domestic
violence.3  This Note argues that these concerns can be addressed,
following extensive study of the existing programs, by implement-
ing nationwide standards for participant eligibility. Of course this is
not to say that veteran offenders should not face the consequences
of their criminal behavior, or that all offenders who are veterans
should be accorded lighter sentences simply on the strength of hav-
ing served in the military. When a veteran offender’s conduct is tied
to injuries or demonstrable trauma sustained during military ser-
vice, however, pre- or post-trial diversionary programs should be
available to that individual, and those programs should be tailored
to the specific and well-understood needs of veterans. Such pro-
grams come at a relatively low cost to taxpayers and, again, will
lower recidivism and help to reintegrate veterans into their families
and communities.
Ultimately, this Note argues that, while there may be problems
with the sources of information regarding the success of veterans’
courts, the available evidence suggests that veterans’ courts can
have a positive impact by reducing recidivism and conserving re-
sources. It would, therefore, likely be beneficial for states to
implement additional veterans’ courts programs.  That said, many
of the potential benefits of veterans’ courts can best be realized—
or, perhaps, can only be realized—through a standardized, uniform
model aligned with the best treatment practices for issues stemming
from trauma suffered by veterans. Further, this need for standardi-
zation or uniformity suggests that, in the absence of unified or
coordinated state action, the optimal approach for implementing
veterans’ courts programs in state court systems is through federally
3. E.g., Pamela Kravetz, Note, Way off Base: An Argument Against Intimate Partner Violence
Cases in Veterans Treatment Courts, 4 VETERANS L. REV. 162 (2012).
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promulgated standards. Setting eligibility standards and determin-
ing an appropriate structure for standardized programs will require
more study of existing programs. The national community—and
not merely individual communities in which veteran offenders
live—has enough of a stake in the problem of veterans in the crimi-
nal justice system that it should invest in shaping these standards.
Part I of this Note traces the history and development of veter-
ans’ courts in the United States, beginning with the first moves
towards such courts in Massachusetts in 2005. Part II analyzes two of
the most serious critiques that face the continued establishment
and vitality of veterans’ courts: first, the question of whether the
American criminal justice system should include any diversionary
programs at all; and second, the question of whether veterans’
courts can and should continue to exist and proliferate in the ab-
sence of national (or well-understood, generally accepted, rational)
standards.  Part III further explores the question of how and why
national standards can and should be imposed, and analyzes availa-
ble data on the performance of courts in three representative
jurisdictions: Minnesota, Alaska, and New Jersey.
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COURTS
Although veterans’ courts have a relatively short history, assessing
the efficacy of such courts and the extent to which they should be
implemented nationally requires understanding how and why these
courts developed as they did. This Part discusses the origins, opera-
tions, and funding of various veterans’ courts, as well as where the
movement in favor of veterans’ courts seems to be heading. Al-
though veterans’ courts have come into being largely through the
initiative of individual judges and have not, therefore, been estab-
lished as part of a standardized national plan (or even statewide
movement ,) these sometimes disparate courts share enough similar-
ities that a brief overview will be useful for understanding the
general rationale and importance underlying such diversionary
programs.
A. The Origins of Veterans’ Courts
Veterans’ courts in the United States are a product of the post-9/
11 era and are likely tied to the enormous surge in the number of
veterans resulting from the United States’ involvement in wars in
SUMMER 2015] Proportional Response 1043
Afghanistan and Iraq through the 2000s. Tentative movements to-
ward the establishment of veterans’ courts began in Massachusetts
in January of 2005, when Representative Patricia Jehlen introduced
House Bill 863, which would have “require[d] the establishment of
a ‘veteran’s court’ to hear all cases in the criminal justice system
involving veterans as defendants, and require[d] that the court
make all possible efforts to channel veterans toward rehabilitation
programs.”4 Neither this Act, however, nor New York’s 2007 Assem-
bly Bill 11649/S8621, which “would have created a pilot program in
New York City and Utica to handle any criminal cases in which a
veteran was a defendant,” passed the committee stage.5
Given that these state-level efforts did not result in the creation
of veterans’ courts, the veterans’ court movement actually took
shape when judges began to realize that, even though veterans are
not overrepresented in the prison system by their proportion in the
U.S. population as a whole, a large number of veterans were com-
ing through their courts—and through drug and mental health
courts in particular.6 The cases involving such veterans caught the
attention of such judges as the Honorable Robert Russell of the
Buffalo City Court because the veterans these judges saw often ex-
hibited similar problems and behaviors.7  This continues to be the
case, and, indeed, the sorts of issues witnessed by these judges—
4. H.B. 863, 180th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005), available at http://www.mass
.gov/legis/bills/house/184/ht00/ht00863.htm.
5. Focus: Veterans’ Courts, 3 GAVEL TO GAVEL: A REV. ST. LEGIS. AFFECTING CTS. 1 (Feb.
19, 2009), available at http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/gavel-to-gavel/
home/~/media/Microsites/Files/Gavel%20to%20Gavel/archived%20pdfs/G%20to%20G%
203-8.ashx.
6. Hearing on Assemb. B. 187 Before the Comm. on Judiciary, 75th Sess. 3 (Nev. 2009) [here-
inafter Hearing on Assemb. B. 187] (statement of Assemb. Barbara E. Buckley), available at
http://leg.state.nv.us/75th2009/Minutes/Senate/JUD/Final/914.pdf (“After counting 300
veterans in the local courts during 2007, Judge Russell decided to structure a veterans treat-
ment court to address not only the veterans’ crimes but their unique mental health issues.”);
Responding to the Needs of Justice-Involved Combat Veterans with Service-Related Trauma and Mental
Health Conditions, CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. NAT’L GAINS CTR 1 (2008), http://jus-
ticeforvets.org/sites/default/files/files/GAINS%20Report%5B1%5D_0.pdf [hereinafter
Responding to the Needs of Justice].
7. William H. McMichael, Battle on the Home Front: Special Courts Turn to Vets to Help Other
Vets, NAT’L ASS’N DRUG CRT. PROFS. (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.nadcp.org/Battle-on-the-
Home-Front; see also Responding to the Needs of Justice, supra note 6, at 5 (“Behaviors that pro-
mote survival within the combat zone may cause difficulties during the transition back to
civilian life. Hypervigilance, aggressive driving, carrying weapons at all times, and command
and control interactions, all of which may be beneficial in theater, can result in negative and
potentially criminal behavior back home.”); RAND CORP., Invisible Wounds: Mental Health and
Cognitive Care Needs of America’s Returning Veterans (2008), available at http://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_briefs/RB9336/index1.html (“An estimated 31% of troops returning from
Iraq and Afghanistan have a mental health condition or reported experiencing a TBI [trau-
matic brain injury].”).
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drug dependency and mental illness, for example—are likely to be-
come even more prevalent as “studies indicate that the
development of PTSD is higher among servicemembers who have
served multiple combat tours, which is a hallmark of both OIF [Op-
eration Iraqi Freedom] and OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom],”
and because greater numbers of servicemembers are surviving com-
bat injuries.8 Even with the drawdown of America’s wars there are
now an enormous numbers of veterans entering U.S. society in
comparison to the pre-9/11 era. Moreover, given the economic
problems that have plagued the nation since at least 2008, there are
an enormous number of unemployed or underemployed veterans
in the United States.9
Of course, while many veterans exhibited the same problems and
negative behaviors, they also exhibited many of the same positive
behaviors and attributes. Judge Russell noticed, for example, that
the veterans he saw tended to have positive reactions to two court
employees who were also veterans.10 In an attempt to serve this vet-
eran population, Judge Russell independently established the
country’s first veterans’ treatment court in Buffalo in 2008.11 Other
judges quickly followed suit; by 2009 there were seven more veter-
ans’ courts (in Rochester, New York; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Orange,
Santa Clara, and San Bernardino Counties, California; Anchorage,
Alaska; and Madison County, Illinois).12 As of November 2014, the
National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP) re-
ported there were 184 courts around the country specifically
serving veterans.13
8. FLA. SENATE, INTERIM REPORT 2011-13, COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS AND DOMES-
TIC SECURITY, VETERANS’ COURTS, at 2 (2010), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/
Committees/InterimReports/2011/2011-131ms.pdf; see also McMichael, supra note 7.
9. Chantell Frazier, 2014 Unemployment Rates Decline for Post-9/11 Veterans, but Still Higher
than the National Average, IRAQ & AFG. VETS. AM. (Jan. 9, 2015), http://iava.org/blogs/2014-
unemployment-rates-decline-for-post-911-veterans-but-still-higher-than-the-national-average/.
Unemployment and underemployment are known to have physical and mental health conse-
quences. Psychological Effects of Unemployment and Underemployment, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (2013),
https://web.archive.org/web/20130922 075534/http:/www.apa.org/about/gr/issues/socio-
economic/unemployment.aspx (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).
10. McMichael, supra note 7.
11. Although two judges in Anchorage, Alaska established a court for veterans in 2004, it
is sufficiently different from the type of court that Judge Russell established (see infra Part III)
that his court is widely known as the first.  Jack W. Smith, The Anchorage, Alaska Veterans Court
and Recidivism: July 6, 2004–December 31, 2010, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 93, 109 (2012). See infra Part
III.B.2.
12. Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Courts Developing Throughout the Nation, NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS 1 (2009), available at http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/
nadcp/Future%20Trend%20Article-Final%202009.pdf.
13. Veterans Treatment Court Locations, JUST. FOR VETS, http://www.justiceforvets.org/vet-
erans-treatment-court-locations (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
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B. How the Veterans’ Courts Work
To understand how veterans’ courts work, it is useful to look first
to the example of the nation’s network of drug courts, which are
analogous to the more recently created veterans’ courts. Congress
authorized the creation and federal funding of drug courts in the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.14 Over
the past two decades, drug courts have become a standard part of
state judicial systems. As of 2014, every state and the District of Co-
lumbia has at least one adult drug court or hybrid DWI/drug court;
California has the greatest number, with ninety-nine such courts
statewide.15
The veterans’ courts movement owes much to the development
of drug courts in terms of structure and resources. Because part of
the focus of veterans’ courts is usually to deal with participants’ is-
sues of substance abuse and addiction, the programs use some of
the same treatment and monitoring methods. In fact, Judge Russell
noted in a 2009 article on the operation of the Buffalo Veterans’
Court that “the Buffalo court was able to keep cost relatively mini-
mal the first year by using existing drug and mental-health courts
staff and resources that were already funded and available.”16 Even
with this existing infrastructure, veterans’ courts have some dis-
tance to go to achieve the national scale of drug courts. Veterans’
courts nevertheless currently exist in thirty-six states and are able to
apply for federal grants on a court-by-court basis.17
While the federal government has not provided resources for vet-
erans’ courts comparable to those it provides for drug courts,
various resources (both public and private) for the development of
veterans’ courts are available at the national level. The National As-
sociation of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP), a non-profit
501(c)(3) corporation founded in 1994, is a source of information
and training for veterans’ courts, as well as many other variations on
the drug court system, including hybrid DWI/drug courts and tri-
bal healing to wellness courts.18  Through the National Drug Court
Institute (NDCI), NADCP offers materials and webinars for groups
interested in starting a drug court-type program or improving an
14. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. 3796ii to 3796ii-
8 (2014).
15. U.S. Drug Court Map, NAT’L ASS’N DRUG CT. PROFS., http://www.nadcp.org/learn/
find-drug-court (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
16. Russell, supra note 12, at 3.
17. 42 U.S.C. 3796ii to 3796ii-8.
18. About NADCP, NAT’L ASS’N DRUG CT. PROFS., http://www.nadcp.org/learn/about-
nadcp (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
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existing one.19 For veterans’ courts in particular, a division of
NADCP called Justice for Vets provides detailed advice on how to
establish a veterans’ court. More specifically, Justice for Vets offers
online resources and facilitates visits to four Mentor Courts: the
Buffalo, Tulsa, Rochester, and Orange County Veterans’ Treatment
Courts.20 The DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance provides funding
for teams of court officials to receive five days of training at one of
these courts.21 Justice for Vets hosted the first veterans’ court con-
ference, Vet Court Con, on December 2–5, 2013, with the goal of
offering “critical training to judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
probation officers, volunteer Veteran Mentors, volunteer Veteran
Mentor Coordinators, law enforcement officers, mental health and
drug addiction treatment professionals, VA employees, and many
others.”22 Nearly 1,000 attendees participated in the inaugural con-
ference, which witnessed explicit statements of support for
veterans’ courts from former United States Department of Veterans
Affairs Secretary General Eric Shinseki and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey.23 The second Vet Court Con took
place on May 28–31, 2014, in Anaheim, California, and was sched-
uled simultaneously with the NADCP 20th Annual Training
Conference in order to facilitate attendance at both conferences
for drug court and veterans’ courts supporters.24
In addition to the various conferences they have organized,
NADCP and Justice for Vets have promulgated the “Ten Key Com-
ponents” which serve as guiding principles for veterans’ courts.25
This document is based on the DOJ’s 1997 publication, “Defining
Drug Courts: The Key Components,” which Judge Russell adapted
in 2008 to fit the needs of veterans’ courts. The key components
include:
• The courts integrate alcohol, drug treatment, and mental
health services with justice system case processing.
19. The Drug Court Planning Initiative, NAT’L DRUG CT. INST., http://live-ndci.gotpanthe
on.com/trainings/design_a_drug_court (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).
20. Veterans Treatment Court Mentor Program, JUST. FOR VETS, http://justiceforvets.org/vet-
eran-mentor-courts (last visited Nov. 18, 2014); Resources for Court Professionals, JUST. FOR VETS,
http://www.justiceforvets.org/resources (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
21. McMichael, supra note 7.
22. Vet Court Con 2013, JUST. FOR VETS, http://web.archive.org/web/20130529085251/
http://www.justiceforvets.org/2013-vet-court-con (last visited May 10, 2015).
23. See, e.g., id.
24. See The 2nd Annual Vet Court Con Takes Place in Anaheim, California, JUST. FOR VETS,
http://www.justiceforvets.org/2014-Vet-Court-Con (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).
25. The Ten Key Components of Veterans Treatment Court, NAT’L DRUG COURT RESOURCE
CTR., available at http://www.ndcrc.org/content/10-key-components-veterans-treatment-
courts (last visited May 11, 2015).
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• Using a non-adversarial approach, prosecution and defense
counsel promote public safety while protecting participants’
due process rights.
• Eligible participants are identified early and promptly placed
in the veterans’ treatment court program.
• The courts provide access to a continuum of alcohol, drug,
mental health, and other related treatment and rehabilitation
services.
• The courts monitor abstinence through frequent alcohol and
other drug testing.
• A coordinated strategy governs the courts’ responses to partici-
pants’ compliance.
• Ongoing judicial interaction with each veteran is essential.
• Monitoring and evaluation measure the achievement of pro-
gram goals and gauge effectiveness.
• Continuing interdisciplinary education promotes effective vet-
erans’ treatment court planning, implementation, and
operations.
• Forging partnerships among the veterans’ treatment courts,
the Veterans Administration, public agencies, and community-
based organizations generates local support and enhances the
courts’ effectiveness.
Veterans’ courts around the country now use these principles as
a guide, while integrating distinct visions of what a veterans’ court
should be into their particular programs. For example, Judge Maria
D. Granger of the Floyd County, Indiana, Superior Court explained
that, “Veterans Court is an interventionist approach that addresses
the cause leading to criminal behavior and supports the guarantee
of restorative justice founded in the Indiana Constitution.”26
As I discuss further in Part II of this Note, the most significant
difference among veterans’ courts around the country is the way in
which they select their participants. Although many courts offer the
option of participation in the veterans’ programs only to nonviolent
offenders, some, such as Judge Wendy Lindley’s Orange County
Combat Veterans Court, offer participation to some violent offend-
ers and instead distinguish among types of violent crimes. (For
example, Judge Lindley excludes veterans charged with “crimes
26. Maria D. Granger, Veteran’s Court: Restorative Justice, IND. CT. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2013),
http://indianacourts.us/times/2013/08/veterans-court/.
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such as murder or sexual assault.”27) The Orange County court ac-
cepts only veterans who have been in combat, while others,
including the Buffalo court, do not differentiate based on type of
service. The Buffalo court requires “a clinical diagnosis of serious
and persistent mental-health disease and those with a primary diag-
nosis of substance dependency.”28  The California Penal Code,
meanwhile, requires that the court determine, prior to admission to
the program, whether a convicted servicemember or veteran “may
be suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-trau-
matic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health problems
as a result” of his or her military service.29
The administration of veterans’ courts involves a broad-based
network of participants, including the judges who run the courts,
court officials, probation officers, prosecutors and public defend-
ers, Veterans Administration specialists and treatment providers,
and mentors who are either veterans themselves or are still on ac-
tive duty.30 The mentoring programs are seen as one of the great
strengths of veterans’ courts and have been part of the effort from
the beginning, when Judge Russell noticed that veteran offenders
were able to relate to veteran court officials in an especially positive
way.31 The mentors are typically volunteers, and as the veterans’
court system progresses over time, a number of graduates of the
programs have become volunteers themselves.32 This is a vital ele-
ment of the veteran-specific approach central to the programs: the
mentors, along with the other program participants, work to create
an atmosphere reminiscent of the camaraderie veterans exper-
ienced during their service.33 The absence of this aspect of military
life, and of the structure the military provided, is often a contribut-
ing factor to the difficulties veterans experience in the transition
back to civilian life; additionally, many feel guilt about not being
able to protect friends in combat or about not returning to their
27. McMichael, supra note 7.
28. Russell, supra note 12, at 2.
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.9(a) (West 2015).
30. BUFF. VETERAN’S TREATMENT CT., BUFFALO VETERAN’S COURT: MENTORING AND VETER-
ANS HOSPITAL PROGRAM POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL, available at http://www.buffalo
veteranscourt.org/sites/g/files/g283702/f/Buffalo%20Policy%20and%20Procedures%20
Manual.pdf [hereinafter Buffalo Veteran’s Court].
31. Russell, supra note 12, at 2.
32. Id.; see McMichael, supra note 7; Eileen C. Moore, A Mentor in Combat Veterans’ Court:
Observations and Challenges, FUTURE TRENDS ST. CTS. 41–42 (2012), available at http://www
.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2012/home/Courts-and-the-Commu-
nity/~/media/Microsites/Files/Future%20Trends%202012/PDFs/AMentor_Moore.ashx.
33. See Granger, supra note 26 (“The camaraderie among veterans is a unique and pow-
erful connection.”); see also McMichael, supra note 7 (“The program is aimed at helping them
regain the sense of discipline and camaraderie they had in uniform. . . .”).
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units after being injured or discharged.34 Veterans who have been
through veterans’ court programs and have reintegrated into soci-
ety cite the emotional support they received as one of the keys to
their success.35 Mentors are able to connect with program partici-
pants especially well because they understand the stigma that
servicemembers and veterans commonly attach to admitting that
they need help in the first place.36 This understanding is one of the
most important reasons to maintain separate treatment courts for
veterans and non-veterans.
C. Status of Veterans’ Courts, Five Years In
According to Justice for Vets and the NADCP, there are currently
184 state-level veterans’ courts across the United States.37 Thirty-six
states have at least one veterans’ court; Pennsylvania tops the list
with sixteen, followed by Michigan with fifteen and Florida with
fourteen.38 Veterans’ courts continue to grow in numbers and sup-
port from state governments in spite of the recent economic
downturn. There are also two federal veterans’ courts, located in
Salt Lake City, Utah, and Roanoke, Virginia.39 The Salt Lake City
court began in March 2010, and the Roanoke court began in early
2011.40 These federal courts were developed in the same ad hoc way
as the state courts. In Salt Lake City, Magistrate Judge Paul Warner
simply obtained approval from then-Chief Judge Tena Campbell of
the District of Utah, and “just asked other judges in the federal
courthouse to watch for veterans and send them his way.”41 At this
time, veterans’ courts constitute only about six percent of the total
34. See, e.g., Carol Comegno, Returning Vets: Guilt to the Grave, COURIER-POST (June 15,
2014), http://www.courierpostonline.com/story/news/local/south-jersey/2014/06/15/re-
turning-vets-guilt-grave/10542175/; see also U.S. NAVY NAVAL HEALTH RES. CTR.,
POSTDEPLOYMENT USER GUIDE: TRANSITION WORKBOOK FOR COMBAT VETERANS, available at
http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmcsd/nccosc/postdeploymentUserGuide /grief-and- guilt
.htm.
35. See McMichael, supra note 7; Joe Huisinga, Veterans Treatment Court Celebrates Gradua-
tion in Great Falls, KRTV.COM (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.krtv.com/story/28250965/veterans-
treatment-court-celebrates-graduation-in-great-falls.
36. See McMichael, supra note 7.
37. Veterans Treatment Court Locations, supra note 13.
38. Id.
39. Dennis Romboy, Fledgling Veterans Court Deals with “Root of the Problem,” DESERET NEWS
(Jan. 2, 2011), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700096885/Fledgling-veterans-court-
deals-with-root-of-the-problem.html?pg=all; Jeff Sturgeon, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder
Praises Veterans Court in Roanoke, ROANOKE.COM (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.roanoke.com/
news/article_9e155062-849e-11e3-9296-001a4bcf6878.html.
40. Romboy, supra note 39; Sturgeon, supra note 39.
41. Romboy, supra note 39.
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number of specialty courts in the country, but as demand grows and
the successes become more visible, it is likely that this percentage
will increase.42
While it is too soon for long-term studies of the effectiveness of
veterans’ courts to be available, the data gathered so far suggests
that they are having a very positive impact.43 Judge Russell’s court is
a particularly striking example. As of January 2011, 180 participants
were enrolled, fifty-one had successfully completed the program,
and the recidivism rate was zero percent.44 Of the 202 participants
who had enrolled in the program by November 2011, only twenty-
six had dropped out, and none of the seventy veterans who had
graduated by early 2013 had been rearrested.45 In other words, by
far the majority completed the program—and those who did com-
plete it were remarkably successful. According to NADCP statistics,
nationwide, by November 2011, seventy percent of defendants fin-
ished the programs they enrolled in, and seventy-five percent were
not rearrested for at least two years after completion.46 Although
some court officials, such as those at the veterans’ court in Ionia,
Michigan, have encountered some initial challenges in adapting
the drug court system to the needs of veterans, those administering
these courts are optimistic about the prospects for the courts and
the veterans whose cases are adjudicated in them—especially if they
are successful in receiving grants from the federal government.47
D. Funding the Courts
Veterans’ courts have shown very promising signs thus far, but
the federal government has not yet passed a bill providing funding
42. See U.S. Drug Court Map, supra note 15; Veterans Treatment Court Location, supra note
13.
43. See Justin Holbrook & Sara Anderson, Veterans Courts: Early Outcomes and Key Indica-
tors for Success 5 (Widener Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-25, 2011), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1912655## (“[V]eterans court out-
comes, at least at present, appear at least as favorable as those of other specialized treatment
courts.”).
44. Neale Gulley, Nation’s First Veterans Court Counts Its Successes, REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/09/us-court-veterans-idUSTRE7082U020110109.
45. McMichael, supra note 7; Jessica Trufant, Court Shows Compassion for Mass. Veterans,
METROWEST DAILY NEWS (Feb. 24, 2013), http://www.metrowestdailynews.com/article/2013
0224/News/302249919/?Start=1.
46. Id.
47. Gary Gosselin, Building on a System that Michigan Pioneered: Specialty Courts Help Cut
Costs, Keep Recidivism Rate Down, MICH. LAW. WKLY. (Aug. 30, 2013), available at http://milaw
yersweekly.com/news/2013/08/30/building-on-a-system-the-state-pioneered/.
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for the veterans’ court programs. Senator John Kerry first intro-
duced the Services, Education, and Rehabilitation for Veterans Act
(SERV Act) in 2008, and it promptly moved on to the Committee
on the Judiciary.48 The bill never made it out of committee. Repre-
sentative Patrick Kennedy of Rhode Island introduced the bill’s
counterpart in the House two months later, with the same result.49
The following year, Senator Kerry and Representative Kennedy
again introduced the bills in the Senate and House; the House bill
was referred to the Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Pol-
icy, and the Senate bill to the Committee on the Judiciary.50 In
2011, when Rep. David Cicilline of Rhode Island introduced the
bill, it was referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security.51 Senator Kerry introduced the most recent
version of the SERV Act in 2012, and after two readings legislators
referred the Act to the Committee on the Judiciary again.52 A re-
cent House Oversight and Government Reform Committee session
produced the following unpromising statement about the federal
government’s connection to veterans’ courts:
Many states have given veterans with legal troubles the oppor-
tunity to have their cases heard and resolved through special
courts which liaise with community resources and VA to ad-
dress the root causes of veterans’ legal problems, e.g.,
substance abuse, PTSD, etc. In return for seeking and sus-
taining treatment for these issues, veterans are given the ability
to keep their record clean and resolve their underlying issues.
The Committee will assess VA’s role in cooperating with these
courts and monitor effectiveness.53
Currently, veterans’ courts are funded primarily at the state
level.54 There are several federal funding opportunities for judicial
personnel who want to start veterans’ court programs in their home
48. S. 3379, 110th Cong. (2008).
49. H.R. 7149, 110th Cong. (2008).
50. H.R. 2138, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 902, 111th Cong. (2009).
51. H.R. 2026, 112th Cong. (2011).
52. S. 3702, 112th Cong. (2012).
53. H. COMM. ON VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG., OVERSIGHT AGENDA, https://veter-
ans.house.gov/sites/republicans.veterans.house.gov/files/documents/FINAL%20113th%20
Congress%20Oversight%20Agenda%2001152013.pdf.
54. See, e.g., Letter from Rick Scott, Governor, Fla., to Ken Detzner, Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
State (May 20, 2013), available at http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ Mes-
sage1.pdf; KANSAS CITY, MO. CODE OF ORDINANCES 1 § 2-1464 (2013) (“Pursuant to section
488.2230, RSMo, an additional surcharge in the amount of $7.00 for moving and general
ordinance violations and $3.00 for non-moving violations shall be assessed to fund special
mental health, drug, and veterans courts. . . .”).
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jurisdictions, however. In Michigan, for example, the Muskegon
County veterans’ court program learned in the fall of 2013 that the
DOJ had approved its application for certification by opening the
door to federal grants.55 Muskegon County was one of thirty appli-
cants, out of about 300, to be accepted for an intensive federal
training program in California.56 When that federal program was
delayed and funding for it cut due to federal budget sequestration
in 2013, however, the Muskegon County Department of Veterans
Affairs paid for four members of the veterans’ court team to travel
to Washington, D.C. and train with the NDCI. The county launched
the court in January 2014 and subsequently sought state funding.57
The struggles the Muskegon court has faced are emblematic of the
challenges in establishing veterans’ courts in many other jurisdic-
tions as well.
PART II: PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS
There are several potential problems with veterans’ courts, two of
which stand out as the most frequently discussed or cited. The first
of these is the argument that there are societal problems with al-
lowing any diversionary courts to exist. Ultimately, however, this
potential concern is easily dismissed as a theoretical rather than a
real problem. The second stand-out criticism is that veterans’ courts
lack necessary statewide and national standardization. This problem
is far more troubling, and highlights a central policy and equitable
concern with these sorts of diversionary programs.
A. Concerns about the Trend toward Diversionary Programs
Although veterans’ courts are becoming ever more widespread,
concerns exist both about veterans’ courts and about diversionary
programs in general. Jessica M. Eaglin expresses one such concern
in her 2013 article, Against Neorehabilitation.58 Professor Eaglin de-
fines “neorehabilitation” as the development of “a guiding theory
55. Gary Gosselin, Muskegon County Veteran Court to Be First to Receive Federal Approval,
MICH. LAW. WKLY. (Sept. 9, 2013), http://milawyersweekly.com/milwblog/2013/09/09/
muskegon-county-veteran-court-to-be-first-to-receive-federal-approval/.
56. Id.
57. Stephen Kloosterman, Muskegon County Seeks Funding for Newly Functioning Veterans
Treatment Court, MLIVE.COM (June 8, 2014), http://www.mlive.com/news/muskegon/index
.ssf/2014/06/muskegon_county_seeks_funding.html.
58. Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 189 (2013).
SUMMER 2015] Proportional Response 1053
to transform emergency and short-term reforms [including sen-
tencing reforms such as the creation of drug and other treatment
courts] into a long-term shift in policy and practice away from mass
incarceration” and “an improved theory of rehabilitation to guide
the state in implementing such reform.”59 Her concern is that, as-
suming that the ultimate goal of prison and criminal justice reform
is to solve the problem of mass incarceration, the recent surge of
interest in diversionary programs focuses on the wrong kinds of of-
fenders and thus does not address the true problem of the criminal
justice system: total incapacitation as the primary response to crimi-
nality.60 While it is true that mass incarceration poses a very serious
problem for American society as a whole, however, the goal of the
veterans’ treatment court movement is not primarily to address that
problem, but to provide a particular service to veterans. The incar-
ceration of veterans for crimes that stem from their service
experiences and the focus on incapacitation rather than rehabilita-
tion of these veterans where a clear path toward rehabilitation
exists, is indeed a narrower problem than that of mass incarcera-
tion generally. This is not, however, a sufficient reason not to
attempt to solve the unique problems veterans face within the crim-
inal justice system using diversionary programs as a tool.
David Garland first popularized the term “mass imprisonment” at
the beginning of the twenty-first century; since then, scholars and
other Americans have recognized the negative impact of mass in-
carceration on society as a whole and especially on particular
communities.61  From about 1920 to 1975, the percentage of incar-
cerated Americans was relatively stable, but prison populations
increased year-by-year thereafter.62 Between 1980 and 2008, the
number of Americans in prison quadrupled, from about 500,000 to
2.3 million people63 (approximately 0.7% of the population of the
59. Id.
60. Id. at 211–14.
61. Garland’s definition focuses on large-scale imprisonment as a social rather than a
purely numerical phenomenon. “Mass imprisonment implies a rate of imprisonment and a
size of prison population that is markedly above the historical and comparative norm for
societies of this type. Imprisonment become mass imprisonment when it ceases to be the incar-
ceration of individual offenders and becomes the systematic imprisonment of whole groups
of the population. In the case of the USA, the group concerned is, of course, young black
males in large urban centres.” David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment,
in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 1–2 (David Garland ed., 2001).
62. Mary Pattillo, David Weiman & Bruce Western, Introduction to IMPRISONING AMERICA:
THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 1 (Mary Pattillo, David Weiman & Bruce West-
ern eds., 2004).
63. Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/criminal-justice-fact-
sheet (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).
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United States64). In comparison, the total population of the United
States increased by thirty-five percent between 1980 and 2010.65
The number of persons who are incarcerated or otherwise under
the supervision of the criminal justice system (for example, on pro-
bation or parole) has declined every year since 2008, and the
correctional population now makes up the same percentage of
adult U.S. residents as it did in 1997,66 but enormous disparities
persist along gender, educational, and, most importantly, racial
lines. In addition, the declines in the correctional population do
not necessarily herald the end of mass incarceration. The 2012 de-
crease was the lowest since 2009, and while there were 38,000 fewer
probationers nationwide in 2012 than there were in 2011, the num-
ber of people in jail actually increased by 8,900.67 Meanwhile, “black
males were 6 times and Hispanic males 2.5 times more likely to be
imprisoned than white males in 2012.”68 Mass incarceration and its
attendant problems, such as the institutionalization of socioeco-
nomic inequality along racial lines, thus continue to be pressing
issues.
Eaglin concedes in her article that “it is unclear whether these
reforms [including diversionary programs] are so detrimental that
they do more harm than good,” but argues that “there is a high
political cost in adopting the neorehabilitative model to address the
larger problem of overincarceration in the United States.”69 She be-
lieves that the danger lies in the institutionalization of “three key
perversions into the criminal justice system”:70 a focus on “low-hang-
ing fruits,” or the extraction of the “wrong offenders” from the
system;71 exacerbation of racial disparities within the prison popula-
tion;72 and distortion of the perception of justice73 by increasing the
punishment for “those offenders viewed as undeserving of rehabili-
tation because they are not low-level offenders . . . [or] because they
64. See 2008 World Population Data Sheet, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Aug. 19, 2008),
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2008/2008wpds.aspx.
65. See Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through
_the_decades/fast_facts/ (last visited May 11, 2015).
66. Correctional Populations in the United States, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Dec. 19,
2013), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4843.
67. Total U.S. Correctional Population Declined in 2012 for Fourth Year, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/cpus12pr.cfm.
68. Id.
69. Eaglin, supra note 58, at 210.
70. Id. at 211.
71. Id. at 211–13.
72. Id. at 214–18.
73. Id. at 218–22.
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failed to rehabilitate themselves during their ‘second chance’ op-
portunities from the courts.”74
Eaglin’s claim is that diversionary programs such as drug courts
exclude high-risk offenders, who would benefit the most from reha-
bilitative programs: “[f]or example, a 2000 study found that there
were larger treatment effects for higher risk cases of violent offend-
ers.”75 The study she cites, however, does not support this
argument: “Although the results from the present study indicated
that correctional treatment programs were more effective for
higher-risk offenders, this was not demonstrated to a statistically sig-
nificant degree. Past meta-analyses using the same procedures
adopted here have reported that the risk principle was the weakest
contributor of the three principles” (risk, need, and responsivity)
that the authors considered as factors in the effectiveness of reha-
bilitative programs.76 According to another meta-analysis, a 2006
study of violent offenders in Ohio found that better results came
from “treatment groups with greater overall proportions of high-
risk participants and [from] programs that provided more units of
service or longer service to those among the participants who were
at higher risk.”77
Even assuming that the best results in preventing recidivism
come from offering treatment to higher-risk offenders, however,
would not necessarily militate against the implementation of veter-
ans’ courts. First of all, as the 2007 meta-analysis points out in
reference to the aforementioned 2006 study results, “[s]pecific
treatment needs of offenders, such as substance-abuse problems,
can also be conceptualized as risk factors.”78 Thus, many individuals
who qualify for veterans’ court treatment programs may already fit
into the high-risk category.79 Also, Eaglin’s criticism is based in part
on the understanding that drug and other treatment court pro-
grams typically exclude violent offenders.80 The enrollment of non-
violent offenders is indeed deeply entrenched in the drug court
74. Id. at 218–19.
75. Id. at 211 (citation omitted).
76. Craig Dowden & D.A. Andrews, Effective Correctional Treatment and Violent Reoffending:
A Meta-Analysis, 42 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 449, 460 (2000).
77. Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A
Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 297, 312 (2007).
78. Id.
79. The Buffalo Veterans Treatment Court, for example, “serves veterans who are strug-
gling with addiction and/or mental illness.” BUFFALO VETERANS TREATMENT CT., http://www
.buffaloveteranscourt.org/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).
80. Eaglin, supra note 58, at 209 (noting that drug courts focus on “low-level, first-time
offenders”) & n.131 (equating veterans’ courts and other programs with drug courts for pur-
poses of the article).
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philosophy and implementation, but although veterans’ courts take
their structure from drug courts, the violent/non-violent restric-
tions tend not to be as strictly implemented in practice. Several
veterans’ courts have developed specialized definitions of what it
means to be a violent offender; for example, Judge Lindley’s well-
known Orange County program officially accepts both violent and
non-violent offenders but excludes cases of murder or sexual as-
sault,81 and the Buffalo Veterans Treatment Court, while accepting
only “non-violent” offenders, does not exclude those charged with
domestic violence.82 Jacobs, McFarland, and Ledeen found in a
2011 interview with Travis County (Texas) Veterans Treatment
Court Manager Jackson Glass that Travis County “promote[d] re-
strictive eligibility requirements ‘on the books,’ but [was] more
lenient in practice—willing to consider cases on an individualized
basis despite formal policies that accept nonviolent offenders
only.”83 Given that the veterans’ court movement is still in the devel-
opmental phase, it is not useful to presume that veterans’ courts
will only or always address non-violent or “low-level” offenders, and
to evaluate the movement as a whole based on that presumption.
Eaglin’s second objection to diversionary programs is likewise a
bad fit for veterans’ courts. She argues that they exacerbate racial
disparities in the correctional population by removing white people
and not people of color from the criminal justice system “because
the typical risk factors used to screen offenders for rehabilitative
programming are often proxies for structural inequities dispropor-
tionately plaguing historically disadvantaged populations.”84 While
it may well be a valid criticism of drug courts that they use criminal
history to screen potential participants and thus automatically ex-
clude disproportionate numbers of “poor black men” who might
benefit from rehabilitative programs (thus “reinforc[ing] the per-
verse connection between blackness and criminality”85), veterans’
courts have their own, particularized eligibility criteria that are less
tied to race than are those of drug courts.86 Criminal history takes a
81. McMichael, supra note 7.
82. Buffalo Veteran’s Court, supra note 30.
83. Gavriel Jacobs, Katharine McFarland & Gabe Ledeen, Serving Those Who Served:
Veterans Treatment Courts in Theory and Practice 6 (2012) (unpublished), available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/child-page/266901/doc/slspublic/Jacobs_
McFarland_Ledeen.pdf.
84. Eaglin, supra note 58, at 215.
85. Id. at 218 (citations omitted).
86. Approximately fifty percent of incarcerated veterans at the federal and state levels
are white. See MUMOLA, supra note 2, at 4; MARGARET E. NOONAN & CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: VETERANS IN STATE AND
FEDERAL PRISON, 2004 4 (May 2007), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
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backseat to status as a veteran or combat veteran, diagnosis of
mental illness or chemical dependency, whether the criminal be-
havior was caused by a problem connected to military service, the
nature of the crime at issue, and entering a plea of guilty (depend-
ing on the jurisdiction).87 Eaglin also mentions “education,
employment, and socioeconomic status” as “factors dependent on
structural inequities that already exist in society,”88 which thus tend
to reinforce racial disparities when used as selection criteria for di-
version programs. These suspect criteria are not typically factored
into eligibility determinations for veterans’ courts, however, be-
cause it is often presumed that many of the eligible veterans
entered the criminal justice system because of mental illness or sub-
stance abuse problems that are also tied to unemployment and
homelessness.89
The third of Eaglin’s concerns is that a rehabilitative option will
encourage judges and policy-makers to impose harsher punish-
ments on individuals who are disqualified from treatment
programs, or who fail to complete the programs or go on to com-
mit subsequent crimes.  There are two parts to this concern:
statutory enhancement of sentences for particular crimes and un-
duly punitive sentences for offenders who recidivate during or after
a treatment program. For example, several studies of New York
drug courts analyzed by Josh Bowers in 2008 showed that “the
sentences for failing participants in New York City drug courts were
typically two-to-five times longer than the sentences for convention-
ally adjudicated defendants.”90 While it is within the standard
discretion of the court to sentence more harshly based on criminal
history, including criminal activity that led to enrollment in a treat-
ment program in the first place, these numbers are striking. This
set of issues does potentially apply to veterans’ courts as well as drug
courts, and it can only be addressed by changing legislators’ atti-
tudes about rehabilitative programs and the relationship of those
programs to the criminal justice system. The danger of this distor-
tion in sentencing comes primarily from a perception of
rehabilitative programs as an indication that those who do not qual-
ify for them—or are for any other reason unable to complete
them—deserve even more punishment than the state has already
deemed appropriate for a particular crime.
vsfp04.pdf. There are no nationwide statistics on the racial or ethnic identification of partici-
pants in veterans’ courts.
87. McMichael, supra note 7.
88. Eaglin, supra note 58, at 216.
89. Buffalo Veteran’s Court, supra note 30.
90. Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 792 (2008).
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The other side of the coin, and probably the most difficult con-
cern to address, is that by offering treatment rather than the more
punitive option of incarceration without a specific rehabilitation
program to some offenders and not others, diversionary programs
damage the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system by
doling out unequal and thus unfair treatment. To counter this per-
ception, it is important to understand that rehabilitative programs
are geared toward people with specific characteristics, such as hav-
ing served in the military or suffering from a particular type of
mental illness or addiction. Craig Dowden and D. A. Andrews con-
cluded in their 2000 meta-analysis of rehabilitative programs for
violent offenders that the key to reducing recidivism was to ensure
that the program included four factors: providing human services
as part of the program; noting whether the offender presented a
high or low risk of reoffending (although this was not strongly cor-
related to success); addressing the individual factors that caused the
offender to engage in criminal behavior; and using cognitive behav-
ioral and social learning approaches to teach the necessary skills
and appropriate behaviors to avoid reoffending.91 Because pro-
grams must be tailored at least to some extent to the needs of
participants, they are not and cannot be designed to treat all of-
fenders. Offenders for whom no rehabilitative program currently
exists are not necessarily inherently more deserving of punishment
than those who can participate in existing programs (although
some crimes are obviously worse than others and some offenders
cannot be rehabilitated effectively through any of the methods in
use). It is simply not possible to put every offender through (for
example) a veterans’ court program and achieve the current high
rate of success, since veterans’ court programs are designed to ad-
dress certain needs and not others, and so cannot be expected to
help every offender.
It is worth noting that no individual or group appears to be rais-
ing a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection or due process
objection to the implementation of veterans’ courts. Allen Lichten-
stein, General Counsel for the Nevada chapter of the American
Civil Liberties Union, has expressed concern about the underlying
concept of predicating a diversionary program on veteran status,
arguing that “the idea of an entirely different court system based on
status doesn’t make sense. . . . Does that mean a police officer who
is accused of a crime should have a separate court because of his
91. Dowden & Andrews, supra note 76, at 459–60.
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stress?”92 This objection attacks one justification for dedicating the
resources necessary for veterans’ courts—that the veterans have
served their country and been harmed in the process; this is not,
however, the primary reason this Note advocates for implementing
such programs. Diversionary programs for veterans as a group are
effective because they are offered to veterans who share certain life
experiences and certain conditions, such as service-related mental
illnesses or chemical dependencies. These programs target veterans
because they constitute a group of people with enough similar char-
acteristics for similar rehabilitation methodologies to be effective
on a large scale. Thus, to address Lichtenstein’s example, if there
were a flood of police officers into the criminal justice system and
the nature and causes of their offenses suggested that a particular
course of rehabilitative treatment would be effective in preventing
recidivism for a large percentage of the officers, it might well make
sense to create a specialized treatment program for them.
It may be that no one has raised a Fourteenth Amendment objec-
tion because such an objection is unlikely to succeed. The level of
scrutiny applied to differentiated treatment for veterans and non-
veterans would almost certainly be rational basis review (as veteran
status is not a traditionally protected class), and the eligibility re-
quirement most commonly applied in veterans’ courts, that the
criminal behavior be tied to the offender’s military service, provides
a rational basis for treating veterans differently. Vanita Gupta, Dep-
uty Legal Director of the ACLU, has explained that the national
organization supports veterans’ treatment courts because the pro-
grams constitute “a recognition that our criminal justice system is,
frankly, ill-equipped to address the problems of substance abuse,
chemical dependency, [and] mental illness that really plague so
many in our prisons, including the majority of veterans who are
incarcerated.”93 Although veterans’ courts cannot treat all of the of-
fenders who suffer from mental illness or addiction, they do make
an important contribution by assisting the offenders they can treat
most effectively.
To return to the concerns raised in Eaglin’s article: as long as we
recognize that diversionary programs are not sufficient to solve the
problem of mass incarceration, the existence of such programs can
benefit particular populations and, to a lesser extent, society as a
92. Kristina Shevory, Why Veterans Should Get Their Own Courts, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 26,
2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/why-veterans-should-get-
their-own-courts/308716/.
93. McMichael, supra note 7.
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whole, without detracting from the overall mission of criminal jus-
tice reform.
B. The Bigger Problem: National Standards or Not?
Once we accept that diversionary programs with eligibility re-
quirements based on veteran status are acceptable and desirable,
however, another problem arises. Within the set of “veterans,” as
veterans’ courts around the country have found, there are a num-
ber of variables for selecting treatment program participants.
Currently, the standards are largely set on a court-by-court or state-
by-state basis, and their ad hoc nature makes it difficult to predict
or determine what the requirements of a particular court really are.
What this means in practice is that veterans who suffer from similar
conditions and commit similar crimes, but live in different states
(or even different counties within a state) receive disparate treat-
ment. This is problematic because, while there is a rational basis for
distinguishing between veterans whose criminality is connected to
their service and non-veteran offenders, the only basis for treating
similarly situated veteran offenders differently is that most criminal
law is state law. Differences in state laws provide a logical explana-
tion for why similarly situated veterans might be treated differently
by veterans’ courts or diversionary programs, but—especially given
that military service is generally federal service—such disparate
treatment seems inappropriate.
Currently, it is difficult to measure the effect of veterans’ treat-
ment court programs as a whole because of the different standards
of eligibility and because of the relative isolation in which the
courts conduct their daily operations. In order to make the best
possible use of the resources dedicated to veterans’ courts and to
demonstrate the effectiveness of these programs and the advisabil-
ity of creating new ones, it makes sense to establish some sort of
national standards.  For example, there are strong differences of
opinion as to whether veterans who are not combat veterans should
be eligible for the courts, and whether or not veterans who commit
violent offenses should be eligible. Judge Lindley of Orange County
has said that she supports California’s restriction of eligibility to
combat veterans because the experience of combat “resonates very
deeply with them. I think that if they’ve been damaged as a result of
their service . . . in a combat zone, that ethically and morally we
need to respond by offering them special services to restore them to
SUMMER 2015] Proportional Response 1061
who they were.”94 Judge Russell of Buffalo, on the other hand, in-
sists that his court will not discriminate between types of veterans,
since “all vets deserve special consideration simply for their willing-
ness to serve and defend their nation.”95 The Buffalo court does,
however, restrict its eligibility to nonviolent offenders.96 Conversely,
Robert Alvarez, a Marine veteran and psychotherapist with the
Wounded Warrior program at Fort Carson, Colorado, told the Den-
ver Westword News in 2010 that violent offenders “need help more
than anybody. . . . The very skills these people are taught to follow
in combat are the skills that are a risk at home. They’re trained to
react instantly to a threat, because if not, people die.”97  Further
analysis of the data collected by veterans’ courts is necessary to ad-
dress these fundamental disagreements over which policies best
serve the state’s interests both in protecting the public from dan-
gerous offenders and providing rehabilitative treatment to veterans
who can benefit from it.
The federal government can play a positive role in the develop-
ment of veterans’ courts by providing for such a thorough analysis
of veterans’ courts’ data. Commissioning a study of the results of
different programs would help to synthesize the data across jurisdic-
tions and determine the best criteria for potential participants, as
well as the structure that would optimize participant outcomes.
Once it becomes clear whether one approach has significantly bet-
ter results than the other, and if so, which one, federal funding can
be made available as an incentive to encourage more jurisdictions
to structure their courts according to the more successful policies.
An act of Congress would be necessary to provide such funds, but
concrete data on the success of veterans’ court programs might be
helpful in finally getting some iteration of the SERV Act out of
committee.
PART III: EXPANDING THE ARGUMENT FOR NATIONAL
FUNDING AND STANDARDS
The best purely morality-based justification for federal recogni-
tion and funding for veterans’ courts nationwide is the rationale
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Buffalo Veteran’s Court, supra note 30.
97. Joel Warner, Can a Veterans Court Help Former GIs Find Justice Here at Home?, DENVER
WESTWORD NEWS (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.westword.com/2010-02-04/news/can-a-veter-
ans-court-help-former-gis-find-justice-here-at-home/.
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often cited for creating veterans’ courts in the first place: that veter-
ans have given up a great deal for the United States as a whole, so
the United States should have a way of helping them live with the
damages they incurred as a result.98 Following this chain of logic, it
makes sense for veterans to receive the same advantages no matter
where in the country they happen to live. This idea is beginning to
gain currency in the field of higher education, as state universities
offer in-state tuition rates to veterans even though they may not
meet the schools’ technical requirements of residency. For exam-
ple, as of January 2014, the University of Michigan offers in-state
tuition to active or honorably discharged members of the military
and their spouses and dependents, regardless of actual residency.99
Twenty other states have passed legislation offering in-state tuition
to veterans at all of the state’s public universities.100 In Arizona, for
example, honorably discharged veterans can receive in-state tuition
so long as they have “demonstrated objective evidence of intent to
be a resident of Arizona,” which can be as simple as possessing an
Arizona driver’s license, and have registered to vote in Arizona.101
These policies build on the long-accepted practice of helping veter-
ans to reintegrate into civilian life by making some aspects of
civilian life, including education, easier for them to access; Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt explained in his Fireside Chat on June
22, 1944, that veterans “have been compelled to make greater eco-
nomic sacrifice and every other kind of sacrifice than the rest of us,
and are entitled to definite action to help take care of their special
problems.”102 Today it is clear that some of the “special problems”
veterans face involve coping with the requirements of everyday life
while burdened by substance abuse or mental illness related to
trauma experienced during their service, and that these problems
all too frequently lead them into the criminal justice system. State
and federal governments, therefore, are justified by historical pre-
cedent in taking action to help the veterans struggling with these
problems, in this case by helping them to access the rehabilitative
98. See, for example, the tagline of Justice for Vets, featured prominently on the organi-
zation’s website: “Veterans fought for our freedom, now it’s our turn to fight for theirs.” JUST.
FOR VETS, http://www.justiceforvets.org (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
99. University of Michigan Veterans and Military In-State Tuition, U. MICH. VETERAN & MIL.
SERVS. PROGRAM, http://vets.umich.edu/content/university-michigan-veterans-and-military-
state-tuition (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
100. The Fight for In-State Tuition for Veterans, STUDENT VETERANS AM., http://www
.studentveterans.org/what-we-do/in-state-tuition.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
101. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1802 (2014).
102. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement on Signing the G.I. Bill (June 22, 1944),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16525 (internal citations omitted).
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aspect of criminal punishment while also enforcing sufficient inca-
pacitation—and deterrence-oriented measures to protect the
public. Just as veterans should not be kept out of a particular state
university system because of the vagaries of residency requirements,
so their access to treatment programs should not depend on the
state in which they happen to be located.
A. Veterans’ Courts and Punishment
In his 2010 article on veterans and the justice system, Ninth Cir-
cuit Judge Michael Daly Hawkins observed that, because of
widespread concerns that veterans’ courts would provide treatment
to the exclusion of punishment, “the diversion of criminal charges
away from traditional processing and into the treatment mode has
largely been limited to non-violent offenses. Veterans accused of
violent offenses, absent prosecutorial downsizing agreement, are
very likely to be processed in the traditional way, with consideration
of their military experience reserved for sentencing.”103 Judge Haw-
kins suggested that this focus on non-violent offenses might lead to
early intervention for veterans showing troubling patterns of behav-
ior, thereby diverting them from the path to more serious crimes.
Judge Russell of the Buffalo court has said the same thing, but with
the line drawn so as to admit cases of simple assault and domestic
violence.104
The latter category, domestic violence, has proven to be an espe-
cially challenging one to address, reflecting the complexity of
domestic violence itself and American society’s uneven response to
it. For example, one domestic violence organization raised con-
cerns about the balance of punishment and treatment during
testimony on the 2009 Nevada bill that authorized the creation of
veterans’ courts.105 Nancy Hart of the Nevada Network against Do-
mestic Violence argued that the bill should specifically exclude
veterans charged with domestic violence offenses because the “esca-
lating” nature of domestic violence behavior made it particularly
important that such offenders not only be punished but be easily
103. Michael Daly Hawkins, Coming Home: Accommodating the Special Needs of Military Veter-
ans to the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 563, 571 (2010).
104. Kibret Markos, Helping Vets Stop the Cycle of Crime, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Sept. 20, 2010),
http://www.northjersey.com/news/police-on-mission-to-assist-war-vets-1.281857.
105. Hawkins, supra note 103, at 570 (citation omitted).
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identifiable in the criminal justice system.106 The legislature ulti-
mately decided that, because domestic violence sometimes results
from PTSD, the decision as to what treatment program would be
most appropriate for an individual offender should be left to judi-
cial discretion.107 A veteran who is charged with a misdemeanor
involving violence or who has been previously convicted of a felony
involving violence may not, however, enter a Nevada treatment
court program unless the prosecutor agrees.108 The primary objec-
tion to allowing veterans’ courts to handle domestic abuse cases
seems to be a concern that the offenders will not be punished se-
verely enough to deter future violence, and that the lack of severity
will contribute to the systemic failure of American society, and
more particularly the military culture, to take domestic violence
and sexual assault seriously enough.109
This argument does not give veterans’ courts enough credit,
however. The goal of court treatment programs is to address the
underlying problems that contribute to the offender’s criminal be-
havior, thereby preventing that behavior in the future. Whether the
veteran is charged with domestic violence or with driving under the
influence, the resources of the court will be directed toward
preventing recidivism through a combination of punishment, treat-
ment for addiction or mental illness, and assistance with lifestyle
changes. It may happen that a particular veteran is prone to domes-
tic violence for reasons unconnected to the factors that veterans’
court treatment deals with and goes on to commit a domestic vio-
lence offense after completing the program. In that case, it would
be within the discretion of the court to deny that person access to
the program a second time, and he or she would follow a different
path in the justice system, possibly including a treatment program
specific to domestic violence.
A related concern is that the veterans’ courts should not be han-
dling violent offenders because such people are not good
candidates for rehabilitation through treatment programs, because
they do not deserve the opportunity to participate, or because of
the model provided by federal drug court legislation, which explic-
itly excludes violent offenders.110 Some courts and legislatures have
106. Hearing on Assemb. B. 187, supra note 6, at 22 (statement of Nancy Hart, Nevada
Network Against Domestic Violence).
107. LEGIS. COUNS. BUR., POLICY AND PROGRAM REPORT: NEVADA’S COURT SYSTEM 3 (2014),
available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/Publications/PandPReport/26-
NCS.pdf.
108. NEV. REV. STAT. § 176A.290 (2014).
109. See Kravetz, supra note 3, at 186, 188–91.
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3797u-1 (1994).
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handled admission of violent offenders to their programs by requir-
ing the input of the victim,111 while others have relied on less
formal methods to restrict the number of violent offenders in the
programs. In New Jersey, for example, the criminal division man-
ager in Superior Court in Hackensack remarked in 2010 that the
state’s Veterans Assistance Project was “technically open to veterans
who are charged with serious or violent crimes, but the high bail
that comes with such charges would limit a veteran’s chances of
participating[.]”112
B. Veterans’ Courts So Far: What Does the Data Tell Us?
Since veterans’ courts are still relatively new from the standpoint
of data analysis, it is difficult to say with much statistical authority
that one method of implementation has proven more effective than
another. A quick examination of the data that has been collected,
in this case from three representative states (Minnesota, Alaska, and
New Jersey), can distinguish certain approaches that appear to be
working.
1. Minnesota
The Fourth Judicial District of Minnesota was the first jurisdic-
tion in the state to institute a veterans’ court, and in 2012, after two
years of operation, its research division prepared a program review
detailing how the court and associated programs had operated up
to that point.113 From 2010 to 2012, 131 veterans enrolled in the
program. By the end of 2012, thirty-one percent of them had gradu-
ated, fifty-six percent were still in the program, and only eleven
percent had left (either expelled for noncompliance with program
rules or voluntarily withdrawn).114 All persons who have served in
the U.S. armed forces count as “veterans” for purposes of eligibility
for this court, regardless of length of service or what sort of dis-
charge they received; even veterans ineligible to receive benefits
111. Evan R. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice: The Suspended
Punitive Discharge as a Method to Treat Military Offenders with PTSD and TBI and Reduce Recidi-
vism, 208 MIL. L. REV. 1, 7 n.9 (2011).
112. Markos, supra note 104.
113. Anne Caron, Fourth Judicial District Veterans Court—Two Year Review: July 2010–June
2012, FOURTH JUD. DIST. RES. DIV. 6 (2013), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Docu-
ments/4/Public/Research/Veterans_Court_Two_Year_Review.pdf.
114. Id. at 3.
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through the Veterans Administration may still participate.115 Partici-
pants must have a “treatable chemical dependency and/or mental
health issues.”116 Any presumptive probation offense, as defined by
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, is accepted, including of-
fenses as serious as felony driving while intoxicated and assault in
the second degree if the veteran has a low criminal history score, or
less serious offenses that combine to produce a high criminal his-
tory score.117 Twenty-five percent of the participants entered the
program with a felony charge.118 As long as they do not have too
high a criminal history score, veterans charged with domestic as-
sault may participate in the program. The most common offenses
during the time period in question were DWIs (forty percent) and
misdemeanor domestic offenses (twenty percent).119 Because of the
short amount of time that the court had been in operation, the
report could only provide preliminary recidivism results: number
and type of new offenses and number of offenses within a given
number of months after entering the program compared to the
same amount of time before entering.120 Based on this limited data
set, researchers concluded that “[g]raduates are more likely than
non-completers to have no new offenses at all four points after en-
tering Veterans Court (6, 12, 18, and 24 months),”and that “[n]ot
only do graduates commit new offenses at a lower rate than non-
completers, but when they do reoffend it is more often a less seri-
ous offense.”121 As initially conceived, the mentoring component of
the program was voluntary, leaving participants to choose whether
or not to have a mentor. The two-year review notes that by the end
of 2012 this program took steps to make mentoring a more central
component, and it recommends that the program continue on
such a course.122
2. Alaska
The Alaska Veterans Court has operated in Anchorage since
2004, making it the oldest court in the country specifically geared
toward helping veterans, but there are key differences between its
115. Id. at 8.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id.; MINN SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY §§ 4.A, 5.A (2013), available at
http://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/images/2013%2520Guidelines.pdf.
118. Caron, supra note 113, at 11.
119. Id. at 14.
120. See id. at 17–18.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 5.
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design and that of the prevalent Buffalo model. As Judge Jack W.
Smith, one of the founders of the court, has said, “[t]he Alaska Vet-
erans Court is a facilitator for veterans to interact with the VA.”123
The court deals only with misdemeanor defendants; misdemeanors
involving violence are accepted, with assault being the most com-
mon offense.124 More importantly, only those who are eligible for
benefits through the Veterans Administration may participate be-
cause all of the treatment and services are provided by the VA.125
This means that the veterans receive services at no cost to them-
selves or to the state or municipal government,126 but it also means
that the types of services are limited; the veterans’ court will refer
veterans to the Anchorage drug or mental health courts “when
their particular problems are more appropriately addressed in an-
other therapeutic court.”127 Participants must attend court dates
over a period of about eighteen months and undergo drug or alco-
hol testing as the court deems necessary, but there is no mentoring
component. From 1994 to 2010, seventy-four veterans participated
in the Anchorage program, and thirty-eight graduated.128 Among
those graduates, there was a forty-five percent recidivism rate.129
That is slightly less than the fifty percent rate in Alaska as a whole
during the same period, but it does not approach the level of suc-
cess seen in courts such as Judge Russell’s in Buffalo.130 Because
mentoring has been a key component of courts using the Buffalo
model and is widely cited as a strong motivating factor for partici-
pants, so much so that veterans who have successfully completed
the programs sometimes become mentors themselves, it seems rea-
sonable to suggest that this missing element would benefit the
Anchorage court.
3. New Jersey
New Jersey’s Veterans Assistance Project (VAP) is an atypical vari-
ation on the veterans’ court model, in that it provides services—
including mentoring—to veteran offenders, but unlike participants
in Minnesota, Alaska, and most other jurisdictions, those veterans
123. Smith, supra note 11, at 109.
124. Id. at 99, 106.
125. Id. at 95.
126. Id. at 102.
127. Id. at 98.
128. Id. at 103.
129. Id. at 107.
130. Id.; Trufant, supra note 45.
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are not subject to any special adjudication or sentencing proce-
dures.131 The materials on the VAP make it very clear that it is not a
“diversionary program.”132 The role of the judiciary is to assist in
identifying veterans when they enter the criminal justice system and
to connect them with the VAP by referring potential participants to
one of the state Veterans Service Offices (VSO).133 Between the first
implementation of the project in December 2008 and October 31,
2014, courts referred 2,751 veterans.134 An analysis of the recidivism
rate among these veterans could be very useful in judging the value
of a court-centered program that diverts veterans from prison, as
opposed to a path leading veterans toward services that can help
them without lessening the severity of their punishment.
C. Possible Next Steps
The available data on veterans’ courts provides excellent reason
to hope that their national expansion could significantly reduce re-
cidivism and improve the lives and prospects of thousands of
veterans who would otherwise become entangled in the criminal
justice system and become a burden to society as a whole. However,
it is clear that if veterans’ courts are to have a significant impact,
legislators must take serious steps to expand the courts’ reach and
scope.
First and foremost, Congress should pass a modified version of
the SERV Act. There is obviously a great deal of grassroots support
for veterans’ court programs, as is the case with many programs that
assist veterans.135 The DOJ under the Obama administration has ex-
pressed its support for diversionary programs, along with other
policies that move away from mass incarceration.136 Attorney Gen-
eral Eric Holder has emphasized the role of diversion and reentry
131. See New Jersey Judiciary Veterans Assistance Project, N.J. JUDICIARY, http://www.judici-
ary.state.nj.us/criminal/Veterans_Assistance_Project.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).
132. Id. at 2.
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id. at 1.
135. See, e.g., ILL. WORKFORCE INV. BD. VETERANS TASK FORCE, VETERANS TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13–14, available at http://www.illinoisworknet.com/
NR/rdonlyres/657DA3F5-753E-4E7D-9193-CF54A5EBC39C/0/VeteransTaskForceReportFi
nalDraft3_17_11.pdf.
136. One example is a reduction in the use of mandatory minimum sentences for nonvio-
lent drug crimes, through the “Smart on Crime” initiative unveiled in August 2013. Eric H.
Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association’s
House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/ attor-
ney-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-annual-meeting-american-bar-associations; Ari
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courts in this initiative by, for example, directing each U.S. Attor-
ney to designate a Prevention and Reentry Coordinator in his or
her office.137 In the absence of federal legislation, however, several
states have attempted to fill the gap by passing legislation dealing
with the problem of veterans in the criminal justice system in differ-
ent ways. In California, for example, the 2007 modification of
California Penal Code § 1170.9 states that when a veteran who may
be “suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-trau-
matic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health problems
as a result of his or her service” is convicted of an offense for which
the sentence would be imprisonment, the court may, with the vet-
eran’s agreement, order him or her “into a local, state, federal, or
private nonprofit treatment program for a period not to exceed
that which the defendant would have served in state prison or
county jail.”138 This legislation passed before the veterans’ courts
movement really took hold, and it seems clear that having special
court sessions to handle such cases, in which all of the resources are
coordinated, would be more efficient than having individual judges
requesting “an assessment to aid in [the] determination” of
whether a defendant meets California’s criteria on an as-needed
basis.139
With federal funding should come federal standards. Such stan-
dards would save a great deal of time in the organization of
veterans’ courts for state courts and legislatures alike. In Illinois, for
example, the Governor’s Task Force on Veterans and Ser-
vicemembers Courts produced a manual in 2010 that included, at
the front end of the process, decisions on “whether to include mis-
demeanors and/or felonies,” “whether the program is a pre-
adjudicatory/post-adjudicatory/general continuance/probation
program/vacate conviction on graduation program,” and “whether
to include veteran mentors.”140
Melber, For Vets, Rehab Rather Than Prison, MSNBC.COM (July 29, 2014), http://www.msnbc
.com/the-cycle/vets-rehab-rather-prison.
137. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Roanoke Veterans Treatment Court
Program (Jan. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Holder’s Remarks at Roanoke], available at http://www
.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2014/ag-speech-140123.html.
138. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.9(a)–(b) (West 2015); see Adam Caine, Comment, Fallen
from Grace: Why Treatment Should Be Considered for Convicted Combat Veterans Suffering from Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder, 78 UMKC L. REV. 215, 227–30 (2009).
139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.9(a).
140. ILL. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON VETERANS AND SERV. MEMBERS COURTS, IMPLEMENT-
ING VETERANS COURTS OR PROGRAMS IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 4  (2010), [hereinafter
Implementing Veterans Courts], available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/Abstract
.aspx?id= 263707.
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Federal standards for veterans’ courts should include several crit-
ical requirements, such as volunteer mentor programs. Participants
and administrators alike cite mentorship as a crucial component of
the team atmosphere that encourages participants to succeed. Men-
tors also embody the success that troubled veterans can achieve by
committing to the treatment programs and to maintaining health-
ier and more law-abiding behavior. They create little to no financial
burden, because after the initial class of mentors has received any
necessary training, training new mentors can be part of the volun-
teer program.
Similarly, federal standards should make some accommodations
for the veterans who are charged with domestic violence that ac-
knowledges the objections of victim advocacy groups. Nancy Hart,
speaking for the Nevada Network against Domestic Violence, cited
the lack of availability of a domestic violence treatment program for
offenders on the veterans’ court track as a potential weakness of the
program and a concern for her organization.141  In response to
such concerns, federal funding should mandate treatment pro-
grams tailored to domestic violence offenders on at least a regional
level, so that judges would be able to order attendance as necessary.
The 2010 Illinois manual adopts such an approach; it proposes a
case-by-case approach, urging that, although the state statute142
does not exclude them, domestic violence cases should be “care-
fully scrutinized,” “[c]onsideration should be given to whether
violence is a power and control issue or a result of PTSD, etc.,” and
the “[b]ackground of [the] defendant and onset should be
researched[.]”143 Federal funding and guidance would be instru-
mental in implementing this type of case-by-case approach. This
type of treatment program requires local, trained staff to aid courts
in determining which domestic violence offenders belong in a vet-
erans’ treatment court program.
PART IV. CONCLUSION
In his remarks at the federal Roanoke Veterans Treatment
Court, Attorney General Holder gave the veterans’ courts move-
ment his unequivocal support:
141. Hearing on Assemb. B. 187, supra note 6, at 22 (statement of Nancy Hart, Nevada
Network Against Domestic Violence).
142. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 167/20 (West 2010).
143. Implementing Veterans Courts, supra note 140, at 5.
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By offering alternatives to incarceration—and linking partici-
pants with vital rehabilitation and treatment resources—this
program provides a model for preventing recidivism, reducing
relapse, and empowering veterans convicted of certain nonvio-
lent crimes to rejoin their communities as productive, law-
abiding members of society. It’s also saving resources at a time
when they could not be more scarce.144
Veterans’ courts as a nationwide phenomenon are still very much
in the developmental stage. In the first quarter of 2014 alone, how-
ever, several states have taken significant steps toward creating or
expanding veterans’ court programs. In Mississippi, for example,
after multiple failed attempts to pass a bill establishing veterans’
courts,145 the legislature enacted and the governor signed an
amendment to the Mississippi Code instructing the Administrative
Office of the Courts to establish and implement “a uniform certifi-
cation process for all drug courts and other problem-solving
courts,” and authorizing the state circuit court judges to create vet-
erans’ court programs.146
Perhaps most significantly for the future of veterans’ courts, Cali-
fornia is currently considering expanding the veterans’ courts
initiative, at the state level, in several key ways. In an analysis of
California Senate Bill 1227, now codified as California Penal Code
§ 1001.80, the California Senate Committee on Public Safety dis-
cussed the use of veterans’ courts as a mechanism to address the
severe overcrowding in the California prison system.147 Given the
need for immediate action to remedy this problem, the Committee
argued, it would make sense to expand the already established net-
work of veterans’ courts to include pretrial diversionary programs,
thus removing the defendants from the system at the earliest possi-
ble moment. Under the new law, participants are referred to
mental health programs and other necessary services, and, after
completion of diversion lasting not more than two years, the arrest
144. Holder’s Remarks at Roanoke, supra note 137.
145. Bill Rattery, Veterans Courts: 2013 Legislatures Are Both Encouraging Them and Trying to
Give the Executive Control over Them, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Feb. 26, 2013), http://gaveltogavel.us/
2013/02/26/veterans-courts-2013-legislatures-are-both-encouraging-them-and-trying-to-give-
the-executive-control-over-them/.
146. H.B. 585, 2014 Leg. Reg. Sess §§ 4, 82 (Miss. 2014). These programs will not be open
to veterans charged with crimes of violence or those who have been previously convicted of a
felony crime of violence. Id. at § 82(3)(e).
147. S. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, S.B. 1227, 2013–14 REG. SESS., BILL ANALYSIS (Cal. 2014),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_1201-1250/sb_1227_cfa
_20140408_141344_sen_comm.html.
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will be deemed never to have occurred.148 Eligibility for these pro-
grams is also comparatively relaxed, offering participation to
individuals accused of committing a misdemeanor with no mention
of a restriction for violent crimes, and on the basis of conditions
from which the individual may be suffering include “sexual trauma”
related to military service as well as the more usual criteria such as
traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder.149 This law
sets an interesting precedent for states to use in thinking about the
potential benefits of statewide veterans’ court programs. In addi-
tion to casting a wide net in terms of participation, it clearly
emphasizes the important role of access to mental health services in
the veterans’ court scheme.150 By mandating the availability of veter-
ans’ court treatment programs at the pretrial stage, the state
recognizes the value of such programs and signals its trust in the
programs to accomplish the twin goals of helping individual citi-
zens and protecting the public as a whole. It is clear that veterans’
courts are increasingly recognized as a powerful tool in the criminal
justice system, and that it would only prove more beneficial to soci-
ety and to veterans themselves to implement a widespread and
perhaps most importantly standardized network of such courts
throughout the country.
148. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.80 (West 2015).
149. Id.
150. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.80(d)–(g) (West 2015).
